Baptists and the American Civil War: November 12, 1864

sherman_mapToday Union General William T. Sherman, temporarily in Cartersville, Georgia, telegrams General Thomas in Nashville.

Leaving Thomas in command of Union forces in Tennessee and north Georgia, Sherman departs Cartersville for Atlanta, thus beginning his march to the sea on the Georgia coast.

Until December 13, the general will be out of communication with the North while living off the land. The march to the sea will be the most important non-battle maneuver of the war to date. Breaking the back and spirit of the South is necessary, in the minds of many Northerners, to bring the war to a successful conclusion.

Meanwhile, Southern Baptist divines continue their unrelenting defense of slavery. This week Samuel Boykin, editor of Georgia Baptists’ Christian Index, demonstrating the holiness of the institution of slavery and utilizing creative logic based on the argument that slaves are fully human beings (a view opposed by many Southern whites), argues that slaves should not be forced to fight in the war on behalf of the Confederacy.

Whether our slaves should be armed and sent to the field to fight the battles of Southern Independence, is a question now being discussed in private circles and by the newspaper press. No graver question has been sprung upon the country. Such a question ought never to have been agitated. Its discussion is fraught with infinite mischief. It has injured our cause greatly already, for already has it been hailed at the North as an evidence of weakness—as a concession that we have not white men to replenish our armies; and, farther, as an abandonment of the principles upon which we have defiantly justified slavery. We shall no doubt find it in the halls of Congress and in the State Legislature this Winter. These things being so, it is of vital importance that public opinion should take the right direction, and the deliberation of those bodies be guided to just and wise results. No apology, therefore, is deemed necessary for presenting the following views of this question to the consideration of the public.

In the first place, there is no necessity for arming the slaves or any portion of them. There are able-bodied men now enrolled sufficient to achieve our independence. Our army numbers at least half a million, and that is force enough, if well fed and well wielded in defense of home, altars, honor, property, liberty and life, to repel and vanquish twice its numbers. Let it be remembered that success does not depend upon numbers. History demonstrates this fact. It depends upon the spirit of the army, the skill of commanders, and the self-sacrificing consecration of the people. But it is said that our soldiers are not in the field, and cannot be brought into active service. The former statement is true. Only from one-third to one-half are actually in service. The latter is not true. They can be forced to the field. If our authorities do their duty, and the country properly sustains them, they will be brought into the field. If our authorities are incapable of doing this, they are unfit for their places, and should be rebuked by the people; and if the country will not sustain them in necessary measures to this end, it is unworthy of the Government. But already the most vigorous measures are in process of execution for sending every able-bodied man attached to the army to the front. The armies of Virginia and Tennessee are rapidly augmenting, and without further enlargement upon this head, which might be enlarged, we say that it is not a necessity to arm the negroes.

If the negroes are to be put into the army, they may serve either as slaves or freed men. There is no middle course. This unquestionably is the alternative. They must be enlisted, drilled and driven to battle and to the slaughter incident to this destructive war, and surviving, must return to servitude to mingle with their fellows as slaves; or they must be freed, with all the rights of freeman in camp, in the field and at home, when the war closes. Is the first course right, either upon principle of humanity or expediency? We are satisfied that it is neither right nor expedient. They cannot be made available soldiers, as slaves. They have an invincible dread of battles, bombs and bayonets. They have no sense of chivalry. They have no sense of military reputation. They would have no character to lose—no interest to protect—no inducement to fight. Even those who have been put in front of the Yankee armies, and stimulated by the consciousness that they are free and the hope of maintaining their freedom, and accompanied by hypocritical promise of liberation, we know have made but indifferent soldiers. But waiving this point, the enquiry is, is it right to force them into the field as slaves.

Slaves are property—so recognized by the laws, and as we hold, by the teachings of the Bible. But the laws of the land, and the obligations of Christianity, and the moral sense of the people, have imposed limitation upon this right of property. The property which a man has in his slave, is not the same as that which he has in his horse. The difference grows out of the fact that slaves are men, with reason, moral sense and moral responsibility. Slaves, therefore, have rights. They have, among other things, the right to life and humane treatment. That this is true is not a question open to argumentation. It is true by the concession of the laws and of Southern sentiment. Without such concession, it would be folly to undertake the justification of slavery before the civilized world. Without it, there would be a reason for the infernal crusade which Federal fanaticism and cupidity now wage against it. The law of nature guarantees to every man the right to his life and his limbs until forfeited for crime. The Code of Georgia declares that “the laws of nature guarantee to every man the right to his life and his limbs, unless forfeited for crime. The state of slavery debars no one of this right.” (See Code, #1603). Cruelty to slaves is punished by our laws, and a second conviction disqualifies the citizen from owning slaves. (See Code, #s 4400 and 1850). Killing a slave, which, under the circumstances, would make the killing of a white man murder, is murder. (See Code, # 4234). So tenderly regarded is the law of the life of the slave, that all capital offences committed by slaves are tried by the same tribunal before which white men are tried. (See Code, #4719). [By allowing a slave to fight in the war, would the slave’s master] in so doing violate the laws of his country, and wholly disregard the obligations of religion and claims of humanity? Surely there can be but one answer to this question. He could not, therefore, if the government were consenting, put him in the battle-field, for there both life and limb are necessary subjected to loss. It is not enough to say that he has a right to put him to a service which involves some risk of life and limb. War—horrid war, is a different affair from a malarious cotton field. The strong, fierce, controlling element of war is, destruction of life. Well has it been said, that the last analysis of liberty is the blood of the brave. Ours is a war for the defence of liberty, and he who fights our battles, slave or freeman, takes his blood, that is, his life, to the sacrifice. If this is not so, why is it that Southern soil is now the grave of uncounted thousands, the victims of the war? If this question is considered in the light of Scripture authority, it would seem that it admits of no controversy. The injunction of the Apostle is, “Masters, give unto your servants that which is just and equal, knowing that ye also have a master in Heaven.” The slave is entitled to justice at the hands of his master, such justice as comports with the relation he bears to his master. Now, is it palpable to reason and clear in conscience, that, conceding all the obligations that he is under to his master, it is not just to constrain a slave to expose his life in the defence of liberty. He is not only compelled to jeopardize his life in the defence of the liberty of others, but to perpetuate his own servitude. A master, it is clear, cannot do these things.

But it is said the State can arm and force the slaves to into the ranks of the army. Has the State any power over the slave that the master has not. Certainly the State has no more power over the life of a slave than the owner. He limitations of the power of the master we have exhibited to illustrate that of the State. Religion—the laws—the universal construction of the relation that the slave bears to civil society as a man—places the same limitations upon the State that they impose upon the owner. The State is responsible to God—not in its organized character, but in the responsibility of the people to their rulers. We hold it true that the people are supreme politically. They can do what they choose to do—they might degree the destruction of every negro in the land. But when it is said that the people are supreme, it is to be understood that they are not responsible to God—to the opinion of the world—to honor, honesty and right? They are so responsible, and woe be to the nation that ignores that responsibility!

It is not denied but that there is in the Government the right to command by impression or otherwise, the use of the property of the citizen. It can unquestionably command the use of the slave, but the use by the government is subject to the same limitation that rests upon the master—the government can not put the slave to such service a will necessarily imperil his life. The reason is, that whilst the negro is property, he is also a man. A State without a God—without a moral sense—without humanity, might scorn this limitation, and drive the slaves to the front where the storm of battle rages in its utmost violence. Ours is not such a State.

Nor is it denied that the State may command the military service of the citizen. The life of the citizen is at the control of the government, if needed in defence of liberty and religion. The citizen himself can imperil his own life in defence of his property, as he may in defence of his person, his home, and the honor of his wife and daughters. The obligation of the citizen to expose his life in battle underlies all social obligation, and is consistent with, indeed, enjoined by, our holy religion. When he becomes a member of a political community, he conceded to the government the right to use his own person and his life, if necessary, for the common defence.—The reason of this is, the common defence is his defence. The safety of the people is the supreme law, and he is one of the people. How different the position of the slave! He is not a citizen—he is no party to the compact of government—he has no liberty to defend—he has no consent to give or withhold—he is property under the protection of the laws, and he is a man under the protection of Christianity and the charities of an enlightened civilization.

The subject expands under our pen, and we must defer the consideration of other of its phases until our next issue.

Source: “Arming Our Slaves,” Christian Index, November 11, 1864